

Lecture Feb 12

Dynamical phenomena in single and interacting networks



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Outline


-  1. Introduction: failures & recoveries
-  2.1 **Single networks** phase diagram
-  2.2 Finite size effects
-  3.1 **Interacting networks** phase diagram
-  3.2 Finite size effects

A network model with failures and recoveries.

- Each node in a network can be **active** or **failed**.
- We suppose there are **TWO possible reasons for the nodes' failures:** INTERNAL and EXTERNAL.

1. INTERNAL failure: intrinsic reasons inside a node

2. EXTERNAL failure: damage “imported” from neighbors




RECOVERY: A node can also **recover** from each kind of failure.

LET'S SPECIFY/MODEL THE RULES.

1. INTERNAL FAILURES

p- rate of internal failures (per unit time, for each node). During interval dt , there is probability pdt that the node fails.

Recovery: A node *recovers from an internal failure after a time period τ* .




2. EXTERNAL FAILURES – if the neighborhood of a node is too damaged

IF: “CRITICALLY DAMAGED neighborhood”: **less than or equal to m active neighbors, where m is a fixed threshold parameter.**

THEN: There is a probability $r dt$ that the node will experience externally-induced failure during dt .

r - external failure rate

A node recovers from an external failure after time τ' .



FAILURE TYPE	RULE	RECOVERY
Internal failure	With rate p on each node	After time τ
External failure	IF($\leq m$ active neighbors) THEN Extra rate r on each node	After time τ'

Out of these 5 parameters, we fix three of them:
 $m=4$, $\tau=100$ and $\tau'=1$.

We let (p,r) to vary.



It turns out it is convenient to define $p^*=\exp(-p\tau)$.
So we use (p^*,r) instead of (p,r) .

We measure activity Z of the network as a function of (p^*,r) .



Model simulation [Random regular networks]

$\langle Z \rangle$ - average fraction of active nodes (Z fluctuates)




We fix r , and measure $\langle Z \rangle(p^*)$

For some values of r we have a hysteresis loop.



Phase diagram (single network, random regular)



GREEN; High activity Z
ORANGE: Low activity Z


In the hysteresis region both phases exist, depending on the initial conditions or the memory/past of the system.

Blue line: critical line (spinodal) for the abrupt transition $I \rightarrow II$

Red line: critical line (spinodal) for the abrupt transition $II \rightarrow I$



3.1. Interacting networks




Network A


Network B

FAILURE TYPE	RULE	RECOVERY
Internal failure	With rate p on each node	After time τ
External failure	IF($\leq m$ active neighbors) THEN Extra failure rate r	After time τ'
Dependency failure	IF(companion node from the opposite network failed) THEN Extra failure rate r_d	After time τ''


Phase diagram – State (11)




Phase diagram – State (11)




Phase Diagram – State (21)




Phase Diagram – State (12)






Elements of the phase diagram

- 2 critical points
- 4 triple points
- 10 allowed transitions
- 2 forbidden transitions



Using network representation to model phenomena in finance


Let's pick point A, take a small system N=100, and run the simulation



Finite size effects

Sudden transitions

Is there any
forewarning?





(Remember : Z = Fraction of active nodes)


It turns out it can be predicted (to some extent).

Trajectory $(r_\lambda(t), p_\lambda^*(t))$ in the phase diagram (white line, see below).

The trajectory crosses the spinodals (critical lines) interchangeably, and causes the phase flipping.




CDS European network, in time (2006-2014)




Model also predicts the existence of “flash crashes”.

Explanation: Unsuccessful transition to the lower state.





Real stock markets also show a similar phenomenon.

Q: Possible relation?



“Flash Crash
2010”

Simulated and real interacting networks: CDS networks



6: Collective states in simulated and real interacting networks.